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[8. F. No. 18345. In Bank. Dee. 11, 1953.}

THE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. BUILDING MAINTENANCE
CONTRACTORS' ASSOCIATION, INC., et aI., Respondents.
[1] Monopolies-Oartwright Act-Agreements and Oombinations
Prohibited.-Agreement between Bome building maintenance
contractors of city whereunder they not only agree to fix
prices at which maintenance service will be provided, but also
undertake to prevent competition among themselves by forcing
their customers to pay higher prices if they seek to change
maintenance contractors, constitptes a trust as defined by
Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16720, relating to combinations in restraint of trade.
[2] Id.-Cartwr!ght Act-Validity.-Provisions of Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 16723, exempting from operation of Cartwright A.ct
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16700 et seq.) any agreement, combination or association, the object and pnrpose of which are to
conduct operations at a "reasonable profit" or to market at a
"reasonable profit" those products which cannot otherwise be
80 marketed, are too vague and infect the whole statutory
standard of conduct, since there is no common-law background
or fund of common knowledge or experience that would allow
[2] See Cal.Jur., Monopolies and Combinations, § 9 et seq.; Am.
Jur., Monopolies, Combinations and Restraints of Trade, § 16 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 6] Monopolies, § 6; [2, 4, 5] Monopolies, § 5; [8J Statutes, § 76; [7J Monopolies. § 12: [8J Monopolies,
§2.
• .A hearing was cranted b7 the Supretll.e Coun
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either the members of such an association or a court to determine what the quoted words mean.
[S] Statutes-Amendment-Validity.-An invalid amendment to
a valid statute is ineffective for any purpoei!.
[4] MonopoUes-OartwrightAct-Validity.-lf the state could
not attack an amendment to the Cartwright Act exempting
from its operation any agreement, combination or association,
the object and purpose of which are to conduct operations
at a "reasonable pr';)fit." etc. (Bus. 4; Prof. Code, § 16723), on
the ground that it is unconstitutionally vague, it would remain part of statutory standard of conduct and resulting uncertainty would necessitate invalidating entire statute, and
since the amendment is separable from rest of statute it must
be treated as invalid f",r all purposes.
[5] ld.-Oartwright Act-Validity.-Agreements fixing prices are
invalid both at common law and under provisions of the Cartwright Act, and an agreement between some building maintenance contractors of city whereunder they agreed to fix prices
.at which maintenance service will be provided and undertake
to prevent competition among themselves by forcing their
customers to pay higher prices if they seek to change maintenance contractors is not exempt from opel'ation of such statute
by the provision of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16725, that "It is not
unlawful to enter into agreements or form associations or combinations . . . which are in furtherance of trade."
(6] Id. - Oartwright Act - Agreements and Combinations Prohibited.-Ordinarily a person soliciting bids for maintenance
service would do so in advance of 6Xpiration date of his
. current contract, not for purpose of breaching his contract
but to avoid interruption of service in event that he should
not wish to renew it. and hence in the usual situation an
agreement between some building maintenance contractors of
city whereunder they agree to fix prices at which maintenance
service will be provided and undertake to prevent competition
among themselves by forcing their customers to pay higher
prices if they seek to change maintenance contractors does n01
operate to prevent interference with existing contract rights.
[7a,7b] Id. - Oartwright Act - Injunctive BeUef.-A judgment
enjoining certain building maintenance contractors of city
from ''Formulating, promoting, participating or combining in
any understanding, compact, plan or agreement to raise, h,
adhere to or maintain prices for the furnishing of labor,
material and services in the building maintenance industry"
cannot reasonably be interpreted as prohibiting such con[3] Previous statute as affected by attempted but unconstitutional amendment, note, 76 A.L.R. 1483. See, also, Oal.,Jur..
Statutes, § 74; Am.Jur., Statutes, § 4eB et seq.
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tractors from contracting with their customers to provide
services at &nch prices as customers may agree to pay, but
only enjoins contractors from agreeing among themselves to
engage in probibitedactivities.
[8] Id.-Pa.rticular Agreements and Oomblnations.-A price ftxing
agreement is not one whereby one party merely agrees to
supply goods or services to another at a given price, but one
whereby the parties seek to determine price at which goods
or services shall be offered to third parties.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco granting a new trial.
Sylvain J. Lazarus, Judge. Reversed.
Action to enjoin alleged violations of Cartwright Act (Bus.
Order granting defendants
a new trial following a judgment for plaintiff, reversed.

& Prof. Code, §§ 16700-16758).

Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn.
'AssIstant Attorney General, B. Abbott Goldberg, Deputy
Attorney General, Thomas C. Lynch, District Attorney (San
Francisco), and Gregory Stout, Deputy District Attorney,
for Appellant.
Landels & Weigel, Francis McCarty and Stanley A. Weigel
for Respondents.
TRA YNOR, J .-Plaintiff appeals from an order granting
a new trial after judgment was -entered against defendants
in an action brought to enjoin alleged violations of the Cartwright Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§16700-16758.)
The facts are stipulated. Defendants are the Building
Maintenance Contractors' Association, an unincurporated
association, and its members, who are all building maintenance
contractors in San Francisco. The building maintenance in.
dustry is defined as "all persons, associations, firms, partnerships and/or corporations participating in the maintenance
operation (as distinguished from ownership, leasing or managing), cleaning. painting. renovating and supplying of
janitorial service for buildings, lofts and stores in San Francisco. " Maintenance contractors are defined as .. persons,
firms, partnerships and/or corporations engaged, in the build·
ing maintenance industry in San Francisco, in the business of
contracting, for a fixed term, with owners, lessees or managers
of buildings, lofts or stores located in San Francisco to dc.
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for designated buildings, lofts or stores so located, part or
all of anyone or more of the following: Window cleaning,
janitor work, providing of elevator operators and starters,
providing of building engineers for maintaining heating
equipment and for minor repairs, providing of night watchmen and providing of powder room matrons." There are
44 maintenance contractors in San Francisco of whom 30 are
not members of defendant association. Members of the association, however, employ approximately 90 per cent of the
total number of employees employed by all maintenance contractors in San Francisco and service approximately 90 per
cent of all San Francisco buildings, lofts, and stores serviced
by maintenance contractors. Maintenance contractors employ
approximately 25 per cent of the employees supplied by
various unions for building maintenance, and the remainder
of the organized employees are supplied directly to owners,
lessees, and managers. The terms and conditions of employment of the organized workers are the same whether they
are employed by maintenance contractors or directly by
owners, lessees, or managers. All of defendant maintenance
contractors service less than one-half of one per cent of the
buildings, lofts, and stores in San Francisco.
Defendants have agreed that if bids are called for by
any person having an existing, unexpired contract with any
member of their association, the members whose bids are
solicited will report that fact to the association. The association then makes an investigation to determine whether the
price under the existing contract is reasonable, whether the
service is satisfactory, and whether the person soliciting bids
has any specific reason, no matter how trivial or personal,
for dispensing with the services of the current contractor.
If the price is found to be reasonable, the service satisfactory,
and there is no specific reason for changing maintenance contractors, the members are required to submit bids in excess
of the current price. The amount of the excess is determined
by a 'Jcale ranging from 20 per cent down to 5 per cent of the
current price depending on the current job price per month.
If, on the other hand, the current price is found to be unreasonable, or the service unsatisfactory, or there is a specific
reason for changing contractors, members may submit any
bids they see fit. Defendants entered this agreement "with
the intent and for the object and purpose of conducting
operations at a reasonable profit, of marketing at a reasonable
profit products and services which could not otherwise be so
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marketed and of acting in furtherance of trade, and with no
other intent whatever nor for any other object or purpose
whatever. There is no evidence, except as stated in this
stipulation, if any is stated herein, that the effect of the
admitted agreement bas exceeded, exceeds or will exceed the
stated intentions, objects or purposes."
[1] It is clear that defendants' agreement constitutes a
trust as defined in section 16720 of the Business and Professions Code.· Not only have defendants agreed to fix the
prices at which maintenance service will be provided (§ 16720
(d), (e», but they have also undertaken to prevent com·
petition among themselves by forcing their customers to pay
higher prices if they seek to change maintenance contractors.
(§ 16720 (c).) Defendants contend, however, that their
agreement is exelilpted from the prohibitions of the Cartwright Act by virtue of sections 16723 and 16725 of the
Business and Professions Code.
Section 16723 provides that •• No agreement, combination or
association is unlawful or within the provisions of this
chapter, the object and purpose of which are to conduct
operations at a reasonable profit or to market at a reasonable
profit those products which can not otherwise be so marketed."
.,' A trust is a combiIlatiOll of capital, akill or aeta by two or more
persons for any of the folIowiIlg purposes:
.. <a) To create or carry out restrictions ill trade or commerce.
I t (b) To limit or reduce the production, or iIlarease the price of merchandise or of any commodity.
•• (c) To prevent competition iII manufaeturiIlg, making, transportation, aale or purchase of merchandlse, produce or any commodity•
.. (d) To fix at any standard or figure, whereby ita price to the public
or consumer ahall be iII any manner controlled or established, any
article or commodity of merchandise, produce or commerce iIltended for
aale, barter, use or consumption iII this State.
I< (e) To make or enter iIlto or execute or carry out any contract,
obligations or agreements of any kind or description, by which they do
all or any or any combiIlation of any of the folIowiDg:
I< (1) BiIld themselves not to sell, dispose of 01' transport any article
or any commodity or any article of trade, use, merchandise, commerce
or consumption below a common standard figure, or bed value_
I< (2) Agree iII any manner to keep the price of such artiele, commodity or transportation at a fixed or graduated figure •
.. (3) Establish or settle the price of any article, commodity or transportation between them or themselves and others, so as directly or iII·
directly to preclude a free and unrestricted competition among themselves, or any purchasers or consumers iII the sale or transportation of
any such article or commodity.
.. (4) Agree to pool, combiIle or directly or iIldireetly unite any
iIlterests that they may have connected with the sale or transportation
of any such article or commodity. that ita price might ill any manner be
affected. "
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In Cline v. Frink Dairy 00., 274 U.S. 445 [47 S.Ct. 681, 71
L.Ed. 1146J, it was held that the same exemption contained
in the Colorado Anti-Trust Act left the whole statute "with(lut a fixed standard of guilt" and thus rendered it unconstitutional. In Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal.
2d 34 [172 P.2d 867], we ,held that because the exemption
was added to the statute by amendment it was separable from
the rest of the act. Defendants contend, however, that later
decisions of the United States Supreme Court indicate that
it would no longer follow the Cline ease, and that in any
event the state has no standing to challenge the validity of
the amendment upon which defendants rely.
Examination of recent cases upholding statutes attacked
on the ground of vagueness does not persuade us that the
Cline case was wrongly decided or that the Supreme Court
would not follow it today. In Bandini 00. v.Superior Oourt,
284 U.S. 8 [52 s.Ot. 103,76 L.Ed. 136J, the words "unreasonable waste of natural gas" were found to have an ascertainable meaning in the industry involved. (See, also, Kay v.
U"1Iited States, 303 U.S. 1, 9 [58 S.Ct. 468, 82 L.Ed. 607].)
In OhapZinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 [62 S.Ct.
766.86 L.Ed. 1031]. the vague terms of the statute had been
given a sufficiently definite and restrictive interpretation by
the state court. (Of. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507.
518-519 [68 S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. 840] ; Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U.S. 451. 457 {59 S.Ct. 618. 83 L.Ed. 888].) In other
cases. althougb the prohibited acts were ~efined in vague
terms. the statutes were upheld because they required the
presence of an adequately defined specifie intent. (Williams
v. United States, 341 U.S. 97. 101-102 [71 S.Ct. 576. 95 L.Ed.
774] ; Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 515-516 [71 S.Ot.
857, 95 L.Ed. 1137J ; United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7
[67 S.Ot. 1538. 91 L.Ed. 1877] ; Gorin v. United States, 812
U.S. 19, 27-28 [61 S.Ot. 429, 85 L.Ed. 488] ; Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91. 101 [65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495];
F. ct A. lee Oream 00. v. Arden Far"Jfl$ 00., 98 F.Supp. 180,
187, and cases cited.) Thus a person who undertakes to evade
income taxes by padding his expenses has fair warning that
he may violate the law even though he may not be sure where
a jury may draw the line between reasonable and unreasonable expenses. (United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 [62
S.Ct. 374, 86 L.Ed. 383].) As Mr. Justice Holmes said in
sustaining the validity of a statute dealing with contributions for "political purposes," "Whenever the law draws a

.'
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line there will be cases very near each other on opposite sides.
The precise course of the line may be uncertain, but no one can
come near it without knowing that he does so, if he thinks,
and if he does so it is familiar to the criminal law to make
him take the risk." (United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S.
396, 399 [50 S.Ot. 167, 74 L.Ed. 508].)
[2] In the present case, however, the vagueness of the
words "reasonable profit" infects the whole statutory standard of conduct. An agreement is legal or illegal depending on
whether its purpose is to secure reasonable or unreasonable
profits. Defendants can know when they have approached
the line separating legal from illegal conduct only if they
can in some way determine what reasonable profits are. There
is no common law background to guide them (cf. Nash v.
United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 t33 S.Ct. 780, 57 L.Ed.
1232] ), and there is no fund of common knowledge or experience that would allow either them or the court to determine what those words mean. Reasonable profits might
be defined as those that would permit the payment of reasonable wages and provide a reasonable return on the capital
invested. Such a definition, however, would raise serious
difficulties in determining what are reasonable wages and a
reasonable return on capital. (See, Connelly v. General Const.
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 393-394 146 S.Ot. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322];
United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 [41
S.Ct. 298, 65 L.Ed 516].) Moreover, an industry may be
inefficient or producing a product about to be driven from
the market by a superior substitute. In such cases to obtain profits sufficient to permit payment of reasonable wages
and provide a reasonable return on capital would require
suppression of efficient competitors or elimination of the competitive substitute. We do not believe that the Legislature
intended that reasonable profits should carry a meaning that
would permit such a result. On the other hand, we cannot
conclude that reasonable profits should be defined as the
actual profits realized in a free market. The amendment presupposes that the free market is to be interfered with by an
agreement to secure reasonable profits. It would be superfluous if it permitted only those agreements that have no effect on a free market. It may be assumed that in amending
the Cartwright Act the Legislature contemplated that economic considerations may justify restraints of trade in certain circumstances. (See Poultry Producers of 80. Calif. v.
Barww, 189 Cal. 278, 284-285 [208 P. 93] ; D. Ghirardelli Co.
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v. Hunsicker, 164 Cal. 355, 362-363 [128 P. 1041].) It fell
short, however, of expressing its purpose in terms sufficiently
clear to be given effect.
Defendants' contention that the state has no standing to
attack the validity of the amendment cannot be sustained.
[3] It has generally been held that an invalid amendment
to a valid statute is ineffective for any purpose. (Frost v.
Corporation Commission, 278 U.S. 515, 526 [49 S.Ct. 235,
73 L.Ed. 483] ; Waters· Pierce Oil Co. v.Texas, 177 U.S. 28,
47 [20 S.Ot. 518, 44 L.Ed. 657]; Miller v. Union Bank &
Trust Co., 7 Cal.2d 31, 36 [59 P.2d 1024]; Commonwealth
v. Malco-Memphis Theatres, Inc., 293 Ky. 531 [169 S.W.2d
596, 598]; see, also, Bacon Service Corp. v. Huss, 199 Cal.
21, 35 [248 P. 235]; anno., 66 A.L.R. 1483.) [4] If the
state could not attack the amendment on the ground that it
is unconstitutionally "lague, it would remain a part of the
statutory standard of conduct, and the resulting uncertainty
would necessitate invalidating the entire statute. (Cline v.
Frink Dairy Co., supra, 274 U.S. 445, 457.) Accordingly.
it follows from the holding that the amendment is separable
from the rest of the act (Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, supra, 29 Ca1.2d 34, 47-48), that it must be treated as
invalid for all purposes. The problem is well illustrated by
cases involving amendments that have been held invalid because they would deny equal protection by exempting certain classes from the operation of preexisting statutes. These
cases hold that since the amendments purporting to create the
invalid exemptions are void, members of the nonexempted
classes are not denied equal protection. (Waters-Pierce Oil
Co. v. Texas, supra, 177 U.S. 28, 47: Ex parte Davis, 21 F.
396, 397-398; Buffalo Gravel Corp. v. Moore, 201 App.Div.
242 [194 N.Y.S. 225, 232], affirmed 234 N.Y. 542 [138 N.E.
439]; Gay v. Brent, 166 Ky. 833 [179 S.W. 1051, 1058];
People v. Butler St. Foundry & Iron 00.,201 Ill. 236 [66 N.E.
349, 356] ; Bacon Service Oorp. v. Huss, supra, 199 Cal. 21,
35.) If, however, the state could not rely on the invalidity
of the amendments in subsequent litigation against members
of the exempted classes,. those classes would escape the operation of the statutes and equal protection would be denied to
those not exempted.
[6] Defendants contend that their agreement is lawful
under the provision of section 16725 of the Business and Professions Code providing that "It is not unlawful to enter
into agreements or form associations or combinationa • • •
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which are in furtherance of trade." This provisions is the
converse of subdivision a of section 16720, which defines an
invalid trust as one created "to carry out restrictions in trade
or commerce. " Since the Cartwright Act articulates in greater
detail a public policy that has long been recognized at common
law (Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, supra, 29 Ca1.2d
34, 44), these provisions must be considered in the light of
common-law precedents. Moreover, it may be assumed that
the broad prohibitions of the Cartwright Act are subject to
an implied exception similar to the one that validates reasonable restraints of trade under the federal Sherman Antitrust
Act. (See Standard Oil 00. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 60
[31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed.619].) Under the Sherman act, however, agreements fixing prices are "illegal per se." (Schwegmann Bros. v. Oalvert Distillers Oorp., 341 U.S. 384, 386 [71
S.Ct. 745, 95 L.Ed. 1035, 19 A.L.R.2d 1119], and cases cited.)
Similarly it has generally been held that such agreements are
invalid in this state both at common law and under the provisions of the Cartwright Act. (Speegle v. Board of Fire
Underwriters, supra, 29 Cal.2d 34, 44; Endicott v. Rosenthal,
216 Cal. 721, 726 [16 P.2d 673] ; People v. H. Jevne 00., 179
Cal. 621, 625 [178 P. 517]..) An exception was recognized
permitting a manufacturer to enter valid contracts with retailers fixing the price at which his product might be sold
(D. Ghirardelli 00. v. Hunsicker, supra, 164 Cal. 355, 362;
Grogan v. Ohaffee, 156 Cal. 611, 614 [105 P. 745, 27 L.R.A.N.S.
395; see Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 16.900-16905), and in Herriman v. Menzies,115 Cal. 16 [44 P. 660, 46 P. 730, 56 Am.
St.Rep. 82, 35 L.R.A. 318], it was held that an agreement between stevedoring firms with respect to prices was not invalid
when it appeared that the firms in question constituted only
an insignificant part of those engaged in the business and had
no power to control prices generally.
Defendants contend that the Herriman case is controlling
here because they service less than ont'-half of one per cent
of the buildings serviced in San Francisco. The Herriman
case was decided before the Cartwright Act was adopted in
1907, and in view of the specific provisions of the act with
respect to price fixing that case is no longer controlling.
(People v. H. Jevne 00., supra, 179 Cal. 621, 625; see United
States v.Trenton Potteries 00., 273 U.S. 392, 397 [47 S.Ct.
377, 71 L.Ed. 700].) In any event, defendants do not constitute an insignificant part of the building maintenance industry
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in San Francisco. That industry consists of those persons and
firms who contract to supply building maintenance service
to owners, lessees, and managers, and defendants' operations
. constitute approximately 90 per cent of those of the industry
as a whole. It is immaterial that the great majority of owners,
lessees, and managers maintain their buildings without the
. assistance of maintenance contractors. In addition to material
and labor, such contractors supply valuable managerial services, and defendants' agreement materially reduces competition in the supplying of such services and affects the prices
at which they are available.
[6] Defendants contend that their agreement is valid because it operates only to prevent tortious interference with
existing contract rights. They point out that a member of the
association is required to submit a higher bid only if the person
soliciting the bid has an existing unexpired contract with
another member, and contend that the purpose of requiring
the higher bid is to avoid inducing a breach of the existing
contract. It is unnecessary to decide whether such a purpose
or effect would validate an agreement otherwise prohibited
by the Cartwright Act. Defendants' agreement goes much
further. Ordinarily a person soliciting bids for maintenance
service would do so in advance of the expiration date of his
current contract, not for the purpose of breaching his contract, but to avoid interruption of service in the event that
he should not wish to renew it. Thus in the usual situation
defendants' agreement does not operate to prevent interference
with existing contract rights, but rather to fix prices and
restrict competition in the future.
[7a] Defendants finally contend that the judgment is
erroneous because it enjoins them from "Formulating, promoting, participating or combining in any understanding,
compact, scheme, pJan or agreement to raise, fix, adhere to or
maintain prices for the furnishing of labor, material and
services in the building maintenance industry," without distinguishing between agreements among themselves in restraint
of trade and legaJ contracts with their customers establishing
prices for particular jobs. [8] In the commonly accepted sense of the term, however, a price fixing agreement is not
one whereby one pal'ty merely agrees to supply goods or services to another at a given price, but one whereby the parties
seek to determine the price at which goods or services shall
be offered to third parties. (See Schwegmarm Bros. v. Calvert
DisUllers Corp., 841 U.S. 384, 386 [71 S.Ct. 745, 95 L.Ed.

./
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1035, 19 A.L.R. 1119] ; Endicott v. Rosenthal, 216 Cal. 721,
725-727 [16 P.2d 673] ; Max Factor ~ Co. v. Kunsman,S Cal.
2d 446, 464 [55 P.2d 177] ; Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 16720, d,
e (1,), (2), (3); 16902.) [7b] Thus the injunction cannot
reasonably be interpreted as prohibiting defendants from contracting with their customers to provide services at such prices
as the customers may agree to pay. It only enjoins defendants
from agreeing among themselves to engage in the prohibited
activities.
Since the stipulated facts support the judgment as entered
and there is no evidence that would support a contrary conclusion, the order granting a new trial is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence,

J., concurred.
Edmonds, J., concurred in the judgment.
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